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RECALIBRATING THE WAR ON TERROR BY 
ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
KEVIN J. FANDL* 
INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism has existed in various forms for hundreds of years.  
Only recently, with the attacks on the United States, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom, has the awareness of terrorism in the Western 
world intensified.  While attacks considered terrorist-based occur on a 
surprisingly frequent basis, these three attacks stand out prominently 
as the starting point for a new era in global relations. 
Terrorist attacks are detrimental to the political, financial and 
social economy, both locally and globally.  Such attacks force a 
greater percentage of public funds to be diverted to national defense.  
Accordingly, those funds cannot be used to directly benefit the 
economies of the world.  Identifying methods to secure a reduction in 
the frequency of terrorist attacks is, therefore, in the best interests of 
all States that benefit from the global economy. 
The United States was attacked in 2001 by a group of terrorists 
hailing largely from Saudi Arabia.1  The alleged mastermind behind 
the attack, Osama bin Laden, was said to be stationed in Afghanistan 
shortly thereafter.2  In retaliation for the attack, the United States 
sought to strengthen United Nations Security Council sanctions 
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 1. See Paul Salopek, Terrorism Finds Foot Soldiers in Saudis, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2001, at 
C1. 
 2. See Edward Cody & Molly Moore, Bomb Kills Four Afghan Civilians, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 10, 2001, at A14. 
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against Afghanistan3 and, after Afghanistan’s refusal to extradite 
Osama bin Laden to the United States, took military action to find 
and bring bin Laden to the United States for trial.4 
The United States’ invasion of Afghanistan was authorized by 
the United Nations5 and began in 2002, leading to the overthrow of 
the Taliban government. Bin Laden remained at large. In a collateral 
effort to democratize the country, the United States spearheaded the 
implementation of a new government in Afghanistan to fill the void 
left by the removal of the Taliban.6 Combat operations continue to 
this day in Afghanistan as pro-Taliban forces attempt to regain ruling 
power.7 
In 2003, the United States intensified its efforts to reduce the risk 
of terrorist attacks by preemptively striking targets in Iraq under the 
belief that Iraq was harboring nuclear weapons and possibly Al 
Qaeda terrorists.8  Unlike the war in Afghanistan, international 
support was severely limited for this invasion.9  After invading, the 
United States captured the former leader, Saddam Hussein, and again 
implemented a new form of government.10 
The U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been justified 
by the current administration as measures necessary to reduce 
terrorism.11  This justification, however, gives rise to several important 
 
 3. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Continues Sanctions Against 
Usama Bin Laden, Al-Qaida Organization, Taliban, U.N. Doc. SC/7274 (Jan. 17, 2002), 
available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2002/sc7274.html (discussing Resolution 
1390, which extended sanctions against the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan). 
 4. See David L. Greene & Tom Bowman, U.S. Lashes Back, BALT. SUN, Oct. 8, 2001, at 
1A. 
 5. See William C. Smith, Legal Arsenal: International Law Can Be an Important Element 
in the United States’ Campaign Against Terrorism,  A.B.A. J., Dec. 2001, at 42, 44. 
 6. See generally UNITED STATES AGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
USAID/AFGHANISTAN STRATEGIC PLAN 2005-2010 (2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/ 
locations/asia_near_east/afghanistan/Afghanistan_2005-2010_Strategy.pdf. 
 7. See Tom Regan, Violence Increasing in Afghanistan, Jan. 17, 2006, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0117/dailyUpdate.html. 
 8. See George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Mar. 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html (discussing Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction and ties with terrorists in his explanation for the U.S. attack on Iraq). 
 9. See Allison Ehlert, Iraq: At the Apex of Evil, 21 BERK. J. INT’L L. 731, 757-66 (2003). 
 10. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law: Use of Force and Arms Control: Turmoil in Iraq, Transitional Agreements, 
and the Capture of Saddam Hussein, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 169, 190-93 (2004); see also Dilip Hiro, 
Iraq: Life after the Constitution, Oct. 20, 2005, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.Article?id=6395. 
 11. See George W. Bush, Speech on Promoting Democracy (Oct. 25, 2004), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7472/speech_on_promoting _democracy.html [hereinafter Bush 
Speech on Promoting Democracy]. 
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questions.  Is military intervention in the Middle East the most 
effective method for reducing the possibility of terrorist attacks?  Are 
efforts at regime change in the Middle East decreasing the number of 
terrorist attacks on foreign targets?  Finally, is forced democratization 
an effective and sustainable method for curtailing terrorist attacks? 
This Article begins with an exploration of the literature 
surrounding the U.S.-led war on terror.  Part I examines justifications 
for the war by considering the claim that democratization yields 
economic development and then examines whether there is a link 
between forced democratization and a reduction in terrorism.  Part II 
sets forth the research questions to be answered in the analysis of this 
literature and data.  Part III briefly describes the methodology to be 
used in answering the research questions.  Part IV analyzes at length 
the assertions that democracy is related to a reduction in terrorism 
and to economic growth.  Finally, the Article concludes that the war 
on terror is leading to an increase in the number of terrorist attacks 
against foreign targets and that sustainable development practices 
would be more effective in curtailing terrorist proliferation. 
I.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Linkage Between Democracy and Economic Growth 
Current foreign policies in the West have not often formally 
recognized the need for greater work toward democracy in the 
Middle East.  President Bush recently spoke about this at the United 
Nations, claiming that democracy “requires building the institutions 
that sustain freedom.”12  Yet the freedom of which President Bush 
spoke is the same freedom that he contends will “change the 
conditions that allow terrorists to flourish and recruit[.]”13  This link 
between spreading democracy and suppressing terrorism is a major 
justification for the war being waged in the Middle East.14 
The democratization process in the early United States, largely 
an internal rather than external process, evolved over a long period of 
 
 12. George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations High-Level Plenary Meeting (Sept. 
14, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/print/20050914.html 
[hereinafter Bush Address to the U.N.]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, After Neoconservatism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2006, 
at 62. 
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time and involved numerous challenges to its efficacy.15  Substantial 
inequalities among states, a civil war, and discriminatory voting 
practices in U.S. history make it clear that democracy does not 
develop easily.  Rejections of liberal democracy from Iraq to 
Venezuela to Indonesia are a reflection of the fact that the benefits of 
democracy are often delayed beyond the threshold of citizen 
patience.  Amy Chua of Yale Law School finds that the basis for this 
disenchantment may lie in the fact that the market democracy 
promoted by the West is not the same as that practiced by the West.16 
David Gillies reviewed the evidence supporting linkages between 
democracy and development and found it “ambiguous, at best.”17  He 
found that, instead of promoting democracy, encouraging good 
governance could yield more productive results for development: 
If the relationship between democracy and economic development 
is empirically open-ended and indirect, at best, then donors may 
need to consider how their democracy, rights and governance 
programs are justified.  Instead of an “all good things go together” 
approach, donors could consider less lofty approaches that focus on 
the enabling conditions for growth and development.  These 
include promoting accountability, transparency, and a predictable 
set of rules to govern economic interactions and public policy.18 
Fareed Zakaria contends that building a democracy is a long-term 
process, and that we should refrain from anticipating final results 
while still in the initial stages.19  He distinguishes democracy from 
“constitutional liberalism” by defining democracy as the process of 
selecting governments, and constitutional liberalism as the protection 
of liberty through rule of law.20  In other words, it is constitutional 
liberalism, not the democratic process, that protects a people from 
authoritarian government and preserves the freedom to act.  
Zakaria’s conception of constitutional liberalism involves not only 
traditional democratic values, but also individual liberty, rule of law, 
and freedom from coercion.21 
 
 15. See The People’s Road: American Democracy, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, at 88 (book 
review). 
 16. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE 13 (2003). 
 17. David Gillies, Democracy and Economic Development, in IRPP POL’Y MATTERS, Apr. 
2005, at 8, 21. 
 18. Id. at 24. 
 19. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME 
AND ABROAD 156 (2003). 
 20. Id. at 18-19. 
 21. Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF. July/Aug. 1997, 22, 
25–27 (“[Constitutional liberalism is] the tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to 
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Elections have been held in both Afghanistan and Iraq since the 
United States intervened.  The high voter turnout and seemingly 
legitimate process was hailed by the international community as a 
success.22  But do elections signify stability or progress?  Jane Boulden 
contends that “[e]lections act as a functional indication of a milestone 
in the peace process, providing the international community with 
evidence of change.  They are not, however, reliable indicators of real 
progress, in either democratization or the establishment of peace.”23 
Terry Lynn Karl at Stanford argues that merely holding elections 
does not constitute a sign of regime change; they must be fair and 
open and accompanied by the “liberalization of authoritarian rule” 
and the creation of a civil society.  “Equating democracy with the 
mere holding of elections or assuming that such elections will 
subsequently generate further and deeper democratic reforms down 
the line commits ‘the fallacy of electoralism.’”24  Referring to 
Zakaria’s notion of illiberal democracies, Karl warns that “excessive 
minimalism,” including superficial changes in leadership, elections, 
and new constitutions and policies, may in fact be simply a shift from 
one type of autocracy to another.25 
Francis Fukuyama examines the linkage between democracy and 
economic development by comparing once popular ideas of rigid, 
authoritarian institutional reforms with modern movements toward 
democracy as “an object of development in itself and a means toward 
economic growth.”26  Fukuyama finds democratic countries often 
perform better in times of political and economic crises due to their 
greater degree of legitimacy and stability; however, he finds a weak 
empirical relationship between democracy and development, arguing 
 
protect an individual’s autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source—state, 
church, or society.  The term marries two closely connected ideas.  It is liberal because it draws 
on the philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberty.  It is 
constitutional because it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law.”). 
 22. See Afghanistan Officials Call Election a Success (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 19, 2005) 
(transcript on file with the author); EU Delegation Calls Afghan Elections “Free, Fair and 
Transparent”, BBC MONITORING INT’L REP., Sept. 19, 2005. 
 23. Jane Boulden, Democracy and Peace-Building, IRPP POL’Y MATTERS, Apr. 2005, at 
29, 43. 
 24. Terry Lynn Karl, From Democracy to Democratization and Back: Before Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule, CDDRL WORKING PAPERS, Sept. 2005, at 3, 7 (emphasis omitted) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 25. Id. at 8. 
 26. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 28 (2004). 
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there is little support for either authoritarian or democratic rule as 
consistent with growth.27 
Mahmood Monshipouri suggests that democracy is not only 
disconnected from economic development, but that it also may lead 
to worsening economic situations.  For example, in examining the 
deregulation and privatization of firms in Latin America, 
Monshipouri contends that poverty has increased, inequalities have 
grown wider, and crime has risen as a result of democracy.28 
Arunabha Bhoumik, writing in the Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy, recently postulated that the war on 
terror is ignoring the underlying causes of terrorist proliferation and 
thereby “exacerbating the terrorist threat.”29  These underlying causes 
are certainly worth examining,30 but the key to understanding why 
terrorist activity continues to intensify may have more to do with the 
exacerbating factors of military intervention.  
B. Forced Democratization and Terrorist Proliferation 
Jason Brownlee of the Stanford Center on Democracy, 
Development and the Rule of Law, contends that forced 
democratization and foreign state building fail to recognize the 
rigidity of local institutions and the potentially detrimental responses 
of locals.31  Using the example of U.S. intervention in Central 
America, Brownlee points out that military intervention failed to 
develop a single true democracy in the region—Costa Rica is the only 
Central American nation to form a democracy, and the United States 
never intervened there.32  Brownlee concludes that in order for 
foreign intervention to succeed, it must be “downsized not 
supersized.”33  He suggests that “[t]he failures of imposed regime 
change lead to the conclusion that indigenous gradual political 
development—with all of its potential for authoritarianism and civil 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Mahmood Monshipouri, Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Integrating 
Developing Countries, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 25, 31 (2001). 
 29. Arunabha Bhoumik, Democratic Responses to Terrorism: A Comparative Study of the 
United States, Israel, and India, 33 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 286 (2005). 
 30. See, e.g., Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terror 
Without the War, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. 587 (2004). 
 31. Jason Brownlee, Imperial Designs, Empirical Dilemmas: Why Foreign-Led State 
Building Fails, CDDRL WORKING PAPERS, June 2005, at 10. 
 32. Id. at 13. 
 33. Id. at 34. 
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unrest—could be the optimal path for sustainable democratization 
and statebuilding.”34 
In a comprehensive and thought-provoking new book, World on 
Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred 
and Global Instability, Amy Chua of Yale University Law School 
postulates that free markets and democracy favor market-dominant 
minorities at the expense of competing ethnic groups, creating 
envious factions and hatred.35  Interestingly, Chua draws attention to 
the fact that the type of democracy being promoted by the West is 
significantly distinct from the type of democracy that exists in 
developed countries today.36  The long-term, often difficult 
democratization model utilized by the West has been replaced by the 
quick-fix package of democratization exported to many developing 
countries today.  The sustainability of recent democratization efforts 
by the West remains to be seen. 
F. Gregory Gause III recently argued in Foreign Affairs that the 
answer to the Middle East violence problem may not lie in immediate 
democratization but rather in long-term solutions that require regular 
U.S. assistance.37  He refers to the 2003 State Department report, 
Patterns of Global Terrorism,38 and concludes that over half of the 
2003 terrorist attacks in non-free countries occurred in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, despite the heralding of recent elections in both of those 
countries.39  He asserts that foreign intervention in its current 
manifestation may not be achieving its goal of reducing terrorist 
attacks.40 
Thomas Carothers suggests that the idea of democracy 
promotion as a solution to Islamic fundamentalism is “badly 
oversimplified and potentially misleading as a policy credo.”41  He 
finds that the Middle East is generally skeptical of Western efforts to 
democratize their region, and the leaders believe that “democracy 
 
 34. Id. at 37. 
 35. CHUA, supra note 16, at 9. 
 36. Id. at 13. 
 37. F. Gregory Gause III, Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?, FOREIGN  AFF., Sept./Oct. 
2005, at 62, 74-76. 
 38. U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003 (2004) [hereinafter 
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM]. 
 39. Gause, supra note 37, at 66. 
 40. Id. at 63. 
 41. Thomas Carothers, Democracy’s Sobering State, 103 CURRENT HIST., 412, 415 (2004), 
available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/CurHistTC.pdf. 
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would likely unleash radical forces that could be harmful to both the 
region and the West.”42 
The cultural makeup of the Middle East may also be contributing 
to the poor prospects for democratization and a reduction in violence 
against foreign forces.  Jane Boulden argues that, where a significant 
gap exists between an outsider, market-dominant minority and a 
poor, destitute majority, democratization can act as an opportunity 
for the poor to “take back” what is rightfully theirs.  “Rather than 
being conducive to peace, therefore, democratization can contribute 
to conflict.”43 
Jennifer Moore argues that the problems of poverty and 
underdevelopment in the Middle East have been compounded by the 
war on terror, and that the substantial reliance on military force as 
opposed to alternative means of fighting terrorism “potentially feeds 
ongoing conflicts rather than repressing them.”44  The poverty and 
underdevelopment that existed in the Middle East prior to recent 
foreign intervention may have been exacerbated by the military 
actions against Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Some members of the international community, while supportive 
of U.S. efforts in the war on terror in many respects, believe that the 
war is actually increasing terrorism.  A 2004 Pew Research Center 
study that surveyed French and German attitudes toward the war on 
terror found that a majority of people “believed that the Iraq war had 
undermined the struggle against terrorists and doubted the Bush 
Administration’s sincerity in trying to combat terror.”45  Lakdhar 
Brahimi, the United Nations Special Envoy to Iraq, stated in April 
2004 that “there is no military solution to the problems [in Iraq], and 
that the use of force, especially the excessive use of force, makes 
matters worse and does not solve the problem.”46 
Daniel Benjamin, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, and Steven Simon of Georgetown University 
recently asserted that the U.S. invasion of Iraq increased the number 
 
 42. Id. at 416. 
 43. Boulden, supra note 23, at 36. 
 44. Jennifer Moore, Collective Security with a Human Face: An International Legal 
Framework for Coordinated Action to Alleviate Violence and Poverty, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 43, 43 (2004). 
 45. Susan Sachs, Poll Finds Hostility Hardening Toward U.S. Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2004, at A3. 
 46. John F. Burns, Iranians in Iraq to Help in Talks on Rebel Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 
2004, at A1. 
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of Jihadists, thereby increasing the long-term threat of terrorism.47  “It 
is simply no longer possible to maintain that the United States is 
winning the war on terror.”48  They find that military intervention is 
often a poor preventative measure against terrorism because the 
military is ill-equipped to address the modus operandi of terrorists.49  
The idea of democratizing the Middle East is good, they suggest, but 
unlikely to succeed without the social, economic, and demographic 
conditions necessary for sustainability.50  They conclude that broad 
reforms and a stronger international coalition are the most effective 
solution to the current quagmire.51 
Democracies are few and far between in the Middle East.52  
Among the non-democratic countries, attempted transitions to 
democracy have largely resulted in a nebulous state between 
authoritarianism and democracy.  Elections are often held with the 
winner already decided, only partial privatization has been 
implemented, and measures taken to appease the international 
community have been mere gestures.53  In her recent book, Terror in 
the Name of God, Jessica Stern argues that democracy is not the most 
effective way to fight terrorism.  She suggests that popularly elected 
parties in some countries are sympathetic to terrorist actors.  To 
support this, she posits the examples of Algeria, where the Islamic 
party took power democratically after a drop in oil prices; Pakistan, 
where the Islamic party that considers the Talibanization of Pakistan 
a priority, took substantial parliamentary seats in the 2002 election as 
a result of the Pakistani government’s support for the war on terror; 
and Turkey, where an Islamic party took 363 of the 550 parliamentary 
seats in the 2002 elections.54 
 
 47. DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE OF THE 
WAR ON TERROR AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT xiv (2005). 
 48. Id. at 126. 
 49. Id. at 198. 
 50. Id. at 200. 
 51. Id. at 197-208. 
 52. According to the Freedom in the World 2005 index, of the eighteen Middle Eastern 
countries identified in that index, seventeen are partly or completely not free (Israel being the 
single exception).  FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2005 (2005), available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005. 
 53. See, e.g., THOMAS CAROTHERS & MARINA OTTAWAY, The New Democracy Initiative, 
in UNCHARTED JOURNEY: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 3, 8 (2005); 
ZAKARIA, supra note 19, at 98-99. 
 54. JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD 287-88 (2003). 
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Fighting this growth in Islamic fundamentalism might be done 
more effectively through enhanced development practices that allay 
these inequities, provide the anticipated benefits of democracy, and 
offer alternative outlets to voice grievances.  Research suggests that 
citizens disgruntled with a lack of equality and social services are 
more likely to explore non-democratic outlets for change, including 
terrorism, if they live within an autocracy, a faltering neo-liberal 
democracy, or a fragile developing democracy.55 
Groups that target the West for their ills grow more powerful 
politically and economically as a result of this rise in dissatisfaction 
with democracy.  Violent Western-led responses to terrorist attacks 
against foreign targets have tended to increase support for terrorist 
groups.  For instance, the United States’ violent military response to 
the terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa was ironically cause 
for celebration among terrorists, as it motivated disparate groups to 
band together; the U.S action unwittingly strengthened the terrorist 
movement.56 
II.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Although wars are often accompanied by elaborate plans of 
attack and engagement, as well as clear targets and goals, the war on 
terror is conspicuously absent of any of these.57  It might be said that 
the goal of the war effort is a significant reduction in terrorist activity, 
since complete prevention is unrealistic.  Reducing the possibility of 
terrorist attacks would certainly restore a layer of global security that 
has begun to erode.  Accordingly, with this goal in mind, plans can be 
derived and measured in terms of how likely they are to achieve this 
goal.  Recent efforts led by the United States to reduce terrorist 
proliferation have involved regime changes, bombing campaigns, 
occupation, and most recently, forced democratization.  How 
successful are these efforts at reducing the possibility of terrorist 
attacks?  Are they having the intended impact on the target 
population? 
The null hypothesis to be tested in this research Article can be 
stated as follows: forced democratization of the Middle East, that is, 
 
 55. See, e.g., Carlos Fortin, Officer-in-Charge, United Nations Conference on Trade & 
Development [UNCTAD], Statement to the United Nations Economic and Social Council: 
High-Level Segment (Jun. 29, 2005), http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/meetings/2005/hl2005/ 
Fortin.pdf. 
 56. STERN, supra note 54, at 289. 
 57. See, e.g., BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 47, at 186-87. 
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democratization accompanied by military or other threatening means 
(measured by type and level of Western involvement in the Middle 
East), will reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks against foreign 
targets.  Accordingly, a rise in the level of foreign involvement in the 
operation of a Middle Eastern State should result in a decreased 
number of terrorist attacks against foreign targets, either in the 
country of involvement or abroad. 
In the alternative, this Article suggests that increased foreign 
military involvement in the Middle East is not positively correlated 
with a decreased number of terrorist attacks against Western targets.  
Further, based on the limited evidence gathered, this Article proposes 
that increased foreign military involvement in the Middle East is in 
fact leading to an increase in the likelihood of terrorist attacks on 
foreign targets. 
This hypothesis will be tested by examining foreign engagement 
in the Middle East using statistical data primarily gathered from the 
World Bank, the U.S. Department of State, Freedom House, and the 
National Counterterrorism Center. 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
Hostilities in the Middle East inhibit the collection of a 
comprehensive set of data that would best serve the analytical goals 
of this Article.  For example, a complete survey might include current 
levels of terrorist activity and proliferation across the Middle East, 
concentration of foreign troops across Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
updated numbers of foreign contractors operating in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  However, existing data on levels of U.S. troop 
involvement in Iraq, the number of terrorist attacks on foreign 
targets, and the number of significant regional attacks by Islamic 
terrorist organizations, prove to be strong indicators of the progress 
being made in the Middle East.  These indicators enable reasoned 
conclusions to be drawn and recommendations to be made. 
Data expressing a linkage between terrorist activity and U.S. 
involvement in the forced democratization of the Middle East are 
calculated by comparing the type and level of Western involvement in 
the Middle East with the number of terrorist attacks led by Islamic 
militants in all parts of the world and the level of coalition troop 
fatalities.  The resulting data reveal a significant rise in the number of 
worldwide terrorist attacks and coalition troop fatalities since the 
U.S.-led invasion and forced democratization of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS: EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT 
PRACTICES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Throughout the Middle East, there is significant support for the 
idea that U.S.-led imperialists are imposing their Western values, 
economics, and politics on an otherwise stable and peaceful society.58  
In the United States, the belief espoused by the Bush Administration 
is that democracy is a necessary and lacking institution in the Middle 
East that will keep the West safe from terrorism.59  Yet stories 
throughout Western newspapers report that terrorist attacks are on 
the rise and that the death toll in the “war on terror” is growing.60  In 
the Middle East, tensions are growing rapidly, and discontent with 
American occupation is leading new terrorist cells to emerge in 
response.61  The question then becomes, is the U.S.-led effort to stunt 
terrorism with democratization having the reverse effect?  Is the war 
on terror creating more terror? 
A. Linkage between Democracy and a Reduction in Terrorism 
In Iraq, the Bush Administration openly pursued a strategy of 
“regime change” as its motivation for war because the regime was 
withholding necessary information regarding its nuclear weapons 
proliferation.62  After invading and discovering no such weapons, 
 
 58. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 45 (discussing the recent Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press poll showing a high degree of ill will and distrust for foreign interveners in 
the Middle East); Steven A. Cook, The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform, FOREIGN AFF., 
Mar./Apr. 2005, at 91 (concluding that while democracy is welcomed in the Middle East, 
militarized delivery of democracy is resisted). 
 59. See Bush Speech on Promoting Democracy, supra note 11 (discussing the long-term 
security that will result from democratization of the Middle East). 
 60. See, e.g., Tom Regan, Global Terror Attacks Tripled in 2004, Apr. 28, 2005, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0428/dailyUpdate.html (discussing the dramatic increase in the 
number of terrorist attacks in 2004); Michael A. Fletcher, 2000th Death Marked by Silence and a 
Vow, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2005, at A13 (reflecting on the more than 2,000 U.S. soldiers that 
have died in Iraq hostilities); Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.net/ (last visited 
March 27, 2006) (suggesting that at least 37,000 civilians have died since the start of the Iraq 
war). 
 61. See Mike Boettcher, Al Qaeda Forming New Cells Worldwide, Jul. 31, 2002, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/31/al.qaeda.super.cells/ (describing the spread of terrorist 
“super cells” across North Africa and Southeast Asia). 
 62. See John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 563 (2003) 
(citing President George W. Bush’s 2002 speech before the United Nations in which he justified 
“the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to enforce existing Security Council 
resolutions and to eliminate a dangerous threat to international peace and security”). 
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fighting terrorism became the central focus.63  This was a logical next 
step since terrorists had largely overrun Iraq after the existing regime 
was removed and stood in the way of the Administration’s efforts to 
establish a democratic system of governance.64 
The view taken by the United States, that forced democracy will 
eliminate terrorism, is limited in international support.65  In the Arab 
world, ruling elites do not favor the use of democracy to eliminate 
Islamic extremism.66  As one scholar put it, “democracy—imported at 
the tip of an M-16 rifle—is looking less and less appealing to many 
Arabs.”67  The story is the same in the non-Arab world where support 
for the invasion was weak and support for the occupation weaker.68 
Regime change is a goal that is distinct and incompatible with the 
goal of reducing terrorism.  In order to achieve some semblance of 
success with regime change, an intervener must play party politics by 
working with the various social and ethnic groups within a country.69  
This includes working with extremist groups that may find an outlet 
in the democratic process (at least initially).  “Especially in violent 
settings, democracies are not built by democrats alone and they are 
not always built by democratic means.”70  Poor strategic planning and 
coordination may result in an unsustainable democracy as well as a 
rise in terrorist activity.71 
More than two years have passed since Iraq was invaded and a 
stable, legitimate government has not yet been established.  A 
constitution was prepared and an interim ruling parliament elected, 
but these are merely icons of a system that has no roots in the Middle 
East.  They are symbolic to the democratic world because they mirror 
staple democratic mechanisms in the West.  However, these events, 
 
 63. See Bush Aides Defend War, CBS NEWS, Mar. 14, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2004/03/18/iraq/main607182.shtml. 
 64. See Bush Address to the U.N., supra note 12. 
 65. See Yochi J. Dreazen, U.N. Report Extols Democracy for Mideast but Criticizes U.S., 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2005, at A4 (discussing a recent U.N. report finding that democratic values 
are essential for the region but that the U.S. efforts are “complicating efforts to bring those 
values about”). 
 66. Carothers, supra note 41, at 416. 
 67. Cook, supra note 58, at 96. 
 68. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 45. 
 69. See CHUA, supra note 16, at 274 (arguing that the United States must not promote 
“unrestrained, overnight majority rule” where market dominant minorities exist but rather 
should ensure judicial and constitutional safeguards to allow for the gradual development of the 
democratizing country). 
 70. Karl, supra note 24, at 33. 
 71. Id. 
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while important, are not indicative of a sustainable, lasting, or 
peaceful democracy. 
The level of foreign troop involvement in Iraq is reflective of the 
role that outsiders play in Iraqi daily life.  U.S. troops patrolling 
streets and performing regular raids of potential terrorist locations 
give the impression that the occupiers are in control of Iraqi security.  
Although coalition troop levels have decreased slightly overall since 
the start of the war, the number of U.S. troops has remained 
relatively constant over time, albeit subject to fluctuation.72  The 
number of coalition troop fatalities, however, has increased since the 
start of the war, totaling over 2,000 to date (see Table 1, below). 
 
 
Table 1a: Terrorist Attacks on and Fatalities of  
Coalition Troops in Iraq by Year (2003-2005) 
 
IRAQ 2003 2004 2005 
Troop Level (Coalition)73 160,505 159,250 169,400 
Number of Fatalities74 579 905 897 
Percent of Total 0.36% 0.57% 0.53% 
 
Table 1b: Troop Levels and Fatalities of Coalition Troops in 
Afghanistan by Year (2002-2005)75 
 
IRAQ 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Troop Level (Foreign) 10,900 14,800 26,480 27,371 
U.S. Military Fatalities 60 12 43 75 
Percent of Total .55% .08% .16% .27% 
 
 72. Note that the number of coalition troops has remained approximately 23,000, while the 
number of U.S. troops   ranged from a low of 115,000 in February 2004 to a recent high of 
160,000 in December 2005.  The most recent data shows 133,000 U.S. troops were in Iraq in 
February 2006.  See IRAQ INDEX: TRACKING VARIABLES OF RECONSTRUCTION & SECURITY IN 
POST-SADDAM IRAQ (Brookings Institution, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 30, 2006, at 20, 
http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex [hereinafter IRAQ INDEX]. 
 73. Id.  The troop levels given above are average figures calculated from the monthly data 
provided in the Index. 
 74. See Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://www.icasualties.org/oif (last visited Mar. 18, 
2006). 
 75. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, AFGHANISTAN INDEX: TRACKING VARIABLES OF 
RECONSTRUCTION & SECURITY IN POST-TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN 4-6 (2005), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/research/projects/southasia/afghanistanindex.htm.  The troop 
levels given above are average figures calculated from the monthly data provided in the Index. 
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Table 2: Number of Daily Attacks  
by Insurgents in Iraq by Year (2003-2005)76 
 
IRAQ 2003 2004 2005 
Number of Daily Attacks 142 587 855 
Number of Coalition Fatalities 437 905 894 
Average Number of Fatalities per Attack 3.08 1.54 1.05 
 
The table below represents the number of significant terrorist 
attacks annually from 1998 through 2004.77  In 2004, however, the 
Bush Administration chose to withhold this statistical information to 
avoid giving the impression that the United States was losing the war 
on terror.78  The members of the U.S. Congress subsequently 
pressured the National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) to release 
the actual 2004 statistics, which they did (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Significant Terrorist Attacks (1998-2004)79 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 200480 
Number of Attacks 274 395 426 355 198 190 651 
 
 
 76. See IRAQ INDEX, supra note 72, at 5, 7-8, 22.  Data for Afghanistan insurgent attacks is 
not currently available. 
 77. The actual number of total attacks is significantly higher (over 2,000 in 2004).  Note 
that these numbers do not include the Iraqi civilians killed as a result of the war on terror, which 
the Brookings Institution estimates to be rising and around the level of 8,073–14,400 as of 
August 2005.  See id. at 10. 
 78. See Susan B. Glasser, U.S. Figures Show Sharp Global Rise in Terrorism, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 27, 2005, at A1. 
 79. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 38, at 176. 
 80. Terrorist attack data is not available from the State Department for 2004; the 2004 data 
displayed here was retrieved from the National Counterterrorism Center.  See NAT’L 
COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
FOR 2004 81 ( 2005), available at http://www.tkb.org/documents/Downloads/NCTC_Report.pdf. 
02__FANDL.DOC 8/1/2006  3:00 PM 
314 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 16:299 
Table 4: Terrorist Attacks by Region  
(1998-2003) (Significant and Non-Significant)81 
 
 
Africa Asia 
North 
America 
Middle 
East 
Western 
Europe 
Eurasia 
Latin 
America 
1998-2003 
Total 
Casualties 
5,839 5,273 4,459 2,222 453 743 297 
1998-2003 
Total 
Attacks 
171 458 6 172 213 93 725 
Average 
Casualties 
per Incident 
34.15 11.51 743.17 12.92 2.13 7.99 .41 
 
The type of foreign involvement in the Middle East is highly 
indicative of the anticipated scope of response by opposition forces.  
By 2003, coalition forces in Iraq had shifted their attention to market 
stabilization,82 and by 2004-2005, they were focused on 
democratization.83  The United States led the establishment of a new 
Iraqi Council in July 2003, which announced major market-oriented 
reforms in Iraq two months later.84  Much of the year was spent 
stabilizing oil pipelines to spur production and subsequent export 
income for Iraq.85  In November of that year, the United States took 
over the former United Nations Oil-for-Food program in Iraq.  In 
2004, the focus shifted toward the democratization of Iraq: June 2004 
saw the official transfer of sovereignty from the U.S. Coalition 
Provisional Authority to the interim Iraqi government, which was 
followed by the official election in January 2005. 
 
 81. Id. at 177-78. 
 82. See, e.g., ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, IRAQ ENERGY CHRONOLOGY: 
1980- NOV. 2005 (2005), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/iraqchron.html [hereinafter IRAQ ENERGY 
CHRONOLOGY] (indicating that in 2003, all sanctions against Iraq were lifted, up to 90% of oil 
wells were secured by coalition forces, and Iraq’s leadership council announced free market 
reforms, permitting 100% foreign ownership of all sectors other than natural resources). 
 83. See, e.g., id. (discussing the transfer of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional 
Authority to an interim Iraqi government in June, 2004). 
 84. See John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of the Treasury for Int’l Affairs, Financial 
Reconstruction in Iraq (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases/ 
20040212_taylor.html (discussing anticipated economic reform of Iraq’s banking sector, 
currency, international debt and frozen assets). 
 85. For a chronology of oil-related events in Iraq, see IRAQ ENERGY CHRONOLOGY, supra 
note 82. 
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The type of United States’ involvement in Iraqi affairs shifted 
from military engagement, to market stabilization (primarily through 
oil infrastructure protection),86 to democratic reform (through 
sovereignty transfer, elections, and the attempt to draft a 
Constitution).87  This process—from war to democracy—coincided 
with an increase in U.S. troop fatalities and an increase in worldwide 
terrorist attacks.  While direct conclusions warrant substantially more 
data, which are currently unavailable due to the volatile situation in 
the region, a positive relationship can be seen between the type and 
level of involvement of foreign occupiers and the resulting level of 
terrorist activity. 
B. Why Democracy Cannot Precede Effective Development in the 
Middle East 
Immediate results are central to a policy of forced 
democratization.  When Afghanistan held elections in 2004, the Bush 
Administration hailed this as a shining moment in their newly 
established democracy.88  The same enthusiasm accompanied the 
transfer of power to the Iraqi interim authority in 2004 and the 
elections in 2005.89  But regardless of whether these steps are a sign of 
democratic reform, they most certainly are not a reflection of the 
establishment of a legitimate, sustainable democracy.  Democracy 
takes time to grow and develop, much like any social change.  The 
literature reviewed indicates that an approach that counts on rapid 
democratization through military force is more likely to experience 
substantial cost-overrun and extended periods of engagement in the 
host country than an approach that fosters sustainable development 
while planting the seeds of democracy. 
Promoting successful democracy as a rapid development will 
have two detrimental effects.  First, citizens of the intervening country 
who wish to see a peaceful Middle East will initially support the 
intervention, but their support will wane once the costs of 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Bush Speech on Promoting Democracy, supra note 11 (arguing that the 
United States will gain long-term security if it promotes democracy in the Middle East); Bush 
Address to the U.N., supra note 12 (calling for elections and the building of institutions in Iraq). 
 88. Leta Hong Fincher, The Roots of Terrorism (Voice of America English Service radio 
broadcast Dec. 9, 2004) (transcript on file with author). 
 89. Michael White & Ian Black, Iraq: The Handover: Bush and Blair in Sync as NATO 
Told of Transfer, THE GUARDIAN, June 29, 2004, at 4; see also Peter Baker & Robin Wright, In 
Iraqi Vote, White House Sees Vindication Of Its Course, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2005, at A11. 
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intervention begin to mount without any significant progress being 
made toward peace in the Middle East.  Second, the citizens of the 
host country may also be convinced that democracy will bring them 
the rapid benefits and growth seen in post-World War II Europe, 
East Asia, or other successful democratic transitions.  When these 
benefits fail to materialize quickly, dissatisfaction with the intervening 
country will grow, and the citizens will be more likely to retaliate 
against the country’s forces. 
Democracy must be promoted as a long-term, slow-growth 
process with no expectation of yielding significant economic returns 
in the short-run.  Peace and stability will result from the strengthening 
of institutions, independent judiciary, and effective administration of 
the government.  Rule of law, regulatory reform, and educational 
investment, as well as other necessary sustainability factors, do not 
spontaneously arise from elections or a constitution; they require 
long-term capital investments and internal collaboration with 
minority and majority parties.90 
Democracies with nascent or transitional democratic structures, 
such as those in Latin America, are facing significant challenges to 
their sustainability when immediate anticipated benefits do not 
materialize.  The long process of democratization, much like that of 
economic development, is a fragile, nurture-dependent process that 
yields limited returns, if any, in its formative years.  Arguing that 
democracy is a justifiable basis for intervention, the solution to 
violent insurgency, and the goal for peace, is unrealistic and 
dangerous as a public policy. 
Democracy can work in the Middle East, but it cannot take root 
in infertile soil.  Democracies tend to promote values, such as 
freedom of speech and religion, the right to privacy and self-
determination, that do not coincide with those found in most Middle 
Eastern States.  These are fundamental democratic values that do not 
have any history in the Middle East.91  But this is not to say that they 
cannot be sown. 
Clearly, “[p]reconditions matter a great deal for the survivability 
of democracy but not for the transition to it.”92  Democratization 
 
 90. See generally Gause, supra note 37. 
 91. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Middle East and North Africa: Human Rights 
Developments, in WORLD REPORT 2001 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/ 
mideast/index.html. 
 92. Karl, supra note 24, at 11 (emphasizing the need to address human agency and the 
strategic calculations of actors to promote sustainable democracy). 
02__FANDL.DOC 8/1/2006  3:00 PM 
2006] RECALIBRATING THE WAR ON TERROR 317 
throughout the developing world has succeeded where reform efforts 
began by developing the capacity to sustain an open, heterogeneous 
society.93  Institutions must be established to guide the transition to 
democratic rule.94  Forceful intervention followed by coercive 
democratization tactics rather than collaboration with the 
governments of the Middle East solidifies an image of the United 
States as an imperialist power that does not recognize the unique 
needs and goals of each society.95 
Democracy-building takes time.  Free elections and a draft 
constitution are a small step in the right direction; however, the steps 
that should have preceded these events are largely absent.  As a 
result, the move toward democracy in Iraq is leading to increased 
separatist inclinations, which have existed since the unification of 
Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul96 and which seem unlikely to cease in the 
near future. 
C. Economic Growth and Sustainability 
The values promoted by democracies are separated from those 
of Islamic regimes by a broad chasm, and the bridge connecting the 
two sides is paved with effective development policies.  This Part will 
describe those policies and explain how they can lead to democracy in 
the Middle East. 
During the Wilsonian era, the United States broadly promoted 
democratization as an effort to modernize nations and establish a 
global community of like-minded politicians.97  The goal was the 
establishment of a peaceful trading community wherein all countries 
could leverage their competitive advantage for the greater good of 
the world.  The theory postulates that the key factors of democracy, 
 
 93. Id. at 8. 
 94. See Cook, supra note 58, at 91 (suggesting that democracy did not take hold in the 
Arab world due to the existence of flawed institutions). 
 95. See Ibrahim M. Oweiss, Egyptian Example Shows Need for Homegrown 
Democratization in the Middle East, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF., Apr. 2005, available at 
http://www.washington-report.org/archives/April_2005/0504034.html. 
 96. See, e.g., Judith S. Yaphe, War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could 
Go Wrong?, 57 MIDDLE E. J. 381, 383-84 (2003) (discussing the political picture in early 
twentieth century Iraq); see also Fareed Zakaria, What Bush Got Right, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14, 
2005, at 22 ( “[T]he end of the old order [in Iraq] has produced growing tendencies toward 
separatism and intolerance.”). 
 97. See Jeffrey A. Frieden & David A. Lake, International Relations as a Social Science: 
Rigor and Relevance, 600 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &  SOC. SCI. 136, 142 (2005); see generally 
TONY SMITH, AMERICA’S MISSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE 
FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994). 
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such as free elections, free press, and legitimate constitutions, were 
essential to the growth of the world’s economies and the development 
of a global market.98  While this theory appears logical, data suggests 
that there is only a weak correlation between democratization and 
development and between open markets and growth. 
Although Wilson was unsuccessful in achieving a world of 
peaceful trading nations as he had envisioned, several of his 
successors have made efforts to complete the task, including, most 
recently, George W. Bush.99  The Bush Administration invaded 
Afghanistan with the support of the United Nations Security 
Council100 and with the intention of pursuing those responsible for the 
September 11 attacks in the United States.101  A collateral effect of 
their invasion was the removal of the Taliban government.  Once it 
became clear that the United States would be unable to capture the 
alleged aggressors, it turned its attention to the democratization of 
Afghanistan.  Now, more than three years after the invasion, the 
country is quickly falling into civil war and is rife with corruption and 
crime.102  In Iraq, the story is even more disheartening for democracy.  
With every step toward political stabilization, retaliation grows 
fiercer.103  Why did democratization efforts fail in Afghanistan and 
Iraq when the Marshall Plan met such great success with post-World 
War II Germany and Japan?  Why is democracy promotion in the 
Middle East yielding such unremarkable results? 
The argument that democracy is essential for economic growth, 
prevalent since at least the late 20th century, can be countered with 
one simple word: China.  But this is not the only example—Vietnam, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Cambodia join China in ranking among the 
top twenty countries in terms of annual GDP growth in the last ten 
years, and not one of them has been designated as completely free by 
Freedom House (see Table 5).  These cases of non-democratic 
economic growth challenge the assumption that democracy is 
 
 98. See, e.g., Frieden & Lake, supra note 97, at 141-45 (discussing the theory of 
“democratic peace” and the relationship between trade policy and international politics). 
 99. See, e.g., Bush Speech on Promoting Democracy, supra note 11 (“I believe that 
America will gain long-term security by promoting freedom and hope and democracy in the 
broader Middle East.”). 
 100. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc 
S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001). 
 101. See, e.g., Greene & Bowman, supra note 4. 
 102. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 7; Taleban Leader Promises “Unprecedented Waves of 
Afghan Resistance”, BBC MONITORING INT’L REP., Mar. 16, 2006. 
 103. See supra Tables 1-4. 
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essential for economic development.  This type of “extraordinary 
economic success has presented a serious problem for those arguing 
that democracy is necessary for development or that dictatorial 
regimes cannot produce sustained economic development.”104 
 
Table 5: Annual GDP Growth (%) for  
Twenty Top Performing Countries105 
 
Country Name 
Freedom 
House 
Ranking 
(2005)
106
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Equatorial Guinea Not Free 14.26 29.14 71.19 21.91 41.45 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Partly 
Free 20.80 85.90 36.60 15.60 9.60 
Liberia 
Partly 
Free -4.27 12.12 106.28 29.70 22.90 
Rwanda Not Free 35.22 12.75 13.85 8.86 7.58 
Turkmenistan Not Free -7.20 -6.70 -11.30 6.70 16.46 
China Not Free 10.50 9.60 8.80 7.80 7.10 
Myanmar (Burma) Not Free 6.95 6.44 5.65 5.87 10.95 
Ireland Free 9.86 8.07 11.09 8.64 11.28 
Armenia 
Partly 
Free 6.90 5.87 3.32 7.34 3.30 
Mozambique 
Partly 
Free 4.30 7.10 11.10 12.63 7.54 
Maldives Not Free  8.82 11.52 9.30 7.78 
Angola Not Free 10.40 11.20 7.90 6.80 3.24 
Chad Not Free 0.81 2.40 4.30 5.90 -0.60 
Vietnam Not Free 9.54 9.34 8.15 5.76 4.77 
Uganda 
Partly 
Free 11.52 9.07 5.10 4.91 7.88 
Azerbaijan Not Free -11.80 1.30 5.80 10.00 7.40 
 
 104. Carothers, supra note 41, at 415. 
 105. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DATABASE (2004), 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline [hereinafter WDI ONLINE].  Note that, while many of 
developing countries exhibit a rise in annual GDP, income per capita has fallen as a result of 
higher rates of population growth.  Id. 
 106. FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 52. 
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Bhutan Not Free 6.84 5.49 7.78 7.07 7.00 
Cambodia Not Free 6.89 4.97 6.82 3.68 11.17 
Albania 
Partly 
Free 8.90 9.10 -10.20 12.70 10.10 
Georgia 
Partly 
Free 2.60 11.20 10.52 3.10 2.88 
 
Country Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
10-Year 
Average 
Equatorial Guinea 1.47 1.45 17.62 14.70 9.98 22.32 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 5.60 4.50 3.90 2.70 4.70 18.99 
Liberia 20.40 4.90 3.30 -31.00 2.00 16.63 
Rwanda 5.97 6.72 9.38 0.96 3.66 10.50 
Turkmenistan 18.59 20.43 19.83 16.92 17.00 9.07 
China 8.00 7.50 8.30 9.30 9.50 8.64 
Myanmar (Burma) 13.75 9.70 N/A N/A N/A 8.47 
Ireland 10.08 6.19 6.92 3.70 4.90 8.07 
Armenia 6.00 9.56 13.19 13.91 10.10 7.95 
Mozambique 1.52 13.00 7.40 7.10 7.76 7.95 
Maldives 4.39 3.26 6.08 8.40 8.80 7.59 
Angola 3.01 3.14 14.35 3.45 11.21 7.47 
Chad -0.60 9.90 9.90 11.30 31.00 7.43 
Vietnam 6.79 6.89 7.04 7.24 7.50 7.30 
Uganda 5.38 6.10 6.84 4.73 5.73 6.73 
Azerbaijan 11.10 9.90 10.55 11.20 11.20 6.67 
Bhutan 7.00 7.00 6.68 6.70 4.90 6.65 
Cambodia 6.99 5.56 5.47 5.35 6.00 6.29 
Albania 7.30 7.60 4.70 6.00 6.20 6.24 
Georgia 1.83 4.79 5.48 11.09 8.51 6.20 
 
To yield economic growth and to pave the way for democratic 
reform, sustainable development must be at the top of developing 
countries’ agendas.  This involves more than fundamental economic 
growth—it includes essential types of capital that push economies 
from agrarian or industrial-based towards efficient, knowledge-based 
economies.  With a sufficient concentration of these essential forms of 
capital, a democratic base begins to form upon which international 
institutions can more effectively promote democratic growth. 
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Key indicators of the potential for effective sustainable 
development suggested by the World Bank include: (1) Financial 
Capital; (2) Physical Capital; (3) Human Capital; (4) Social Capital; 
and (5) Natural Capital.107  Together, these indicators comprise the 
foundation on which any society can move toward achieving 
sustainability and eventual democracy.  Development programs that 
fail to address these basic elements are less likely to successfully 
achieve sustainable development and thereby to lay the economic 
foundation for democratic growth.108 
Recent sustainable development reports suggest that successful 
development programs involve a “portfolio of assets.”109  Financial 
capital is an indicator of macroeconomic planning and fiscal 
management,110 while raw labor, social and human capital, and the 
quality of institutions are considered intangible capital.111  Intangible 
capital is a concept that captures assets that are not recorded in 
standard wealth estimates, offering new insights into the inequalities 
between developing and developed countries.  “For example, if an 
economy has a very efficient judicial system, clear property rights, 
and an effective government, the effects will be a higher total wealth 
and thus, an increase in the intangible capital residual.”112 
The primary assets of intangible capital are human capital (the 
skills and knowledge of the labor force), social capital (trust of the 
people in a society) and governance (efficient judicial system, 
property rights and an effective government).113  With these factors at 
the forefront of development projects, sustainable growth becomes 
achievable. 
In order for developing countries to invest in capital growth for 
sustainable development, excess income in the form of savings must 
be generated.  Savings rates vary across countries, but they are 
indicative of development in low-income countries.114  They are also 
 
 107. World Bank, Sustainable Development in the 21st Century, http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/EXTESSDNETWORK/0,,conte
ntMDK:20502659~menuPK:1287775~pagePK:64159605~piPK:64157667~theSitePK:481161,00.h
tml (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Sustainable Development]. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WHERE IS THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: MEASURING CAPITAL 
FOR THE XXI CENTURY xix (2005). 
 110. Sustainable Development, supra note 107. 
 111. WORLD BANK, supra note 109, at 17 n.1. 
 112. Id. at 87. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 71-83. 
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significantly tied to macroeconomic policy, which can affect the 
ability to both generate and protect income in the form of savings, 
and to invest in intangible capital, such as education.  Savings rates as 
a portion of GDP are shown in Table 6 below. 
 
TABLE 6a: Adjusted Net Savings Rates115 (Top Ten and Bottom Ten)116 
 
Country 
Name 
10-Year 
Average 
(1994-2003) 
 
Country Name 10-Year 
Average 
(1994-
2003) 
Singapore 36.98% Syrian Arab Republic -14.41% 
Maldiyes117 35.33% Uzbekistan -15.83% 
Botswana 32.30% Tonga118 -18.22% 
China 29.69% Kazakhstan119 -19.47% 
Eritrea 26.29% Saudi Arabia -26.66% 
Republic of 
Korea120 24.57% 
Angola121 -21.47% 
Luxembourg 24.40% Nigeria -25.55% 
Honduras 23.84% Oman122 -27.97% 
Haiti 23.10% Republic of the Congo -30.88% 
Malaysia 22.24% Azerbaijan -39.64% 
 
 
 115. Adjusted Net Savings, also called “genuine savings,” is a more accurate predictor of 
sustainability because it includes measurements such as human capital and changes in natural 
resources.  See WORLD BANK, supra note 109, at 37. 
 116. WDI ONLINE, supra note 105 (using the series “[a]djusted net savings, excluding 
particulate emission damage (% of GNI)”).  Note that some savings rates are negative, 
reflecting excess government spending. 
 117. Data for Maldives is not available for 1994. 
 118. Data for Tonga is not available for 2002 or 2003. 
 119. Data for Kazakhstan is not available for 1994. 
 120. Data for the Republic of Korea is not available for 1994. 
 121. Data for Angola is not available for 1995. 
 122. Data for Oman is not available for 2003. 
02__FANDL.DOC 8/1/2006  3:00 PM 
2006] RECALIBRATING THE WAR ON TERROR 323 
TABLE 6b: Adjusted Net Savings Rates by Region123 
 
Region 10-Year Average (1994-2003) 
East Asia & Pacific 25.86% 
South Asia 13.36% 
United States 7.85% 
Latin America & Caribbean 7.53% 
Europe & Central Asia124 4.65% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.50% 
Middle East & North Africa -6.40% 
 
Table 6b is particularly telling of the unsustainable and declining 
wealth available within the Middle East.125Wide dispersions of wealth 
in the region prohibit the equal access to education that is seen in 
Asian and European regions.126  When combined with the substantial 
rise in the population of young people throughout the Middle East 
that is anticipated, 127 this limited educational investment could lead to 
a reversal in the development progress made thus far. 
According to the World Bank, intangible capital accounts for 
roughly 75% of the world’s total wealth.128  Developing countries that 
face high levels of poverty and unemployment are more likely to have 
low levels of intangible capital—that is, less technology investment, 
more capital flight, and more emigration of the educated citizenry.  
The result is a country that cannot sustain growth and provide for the 
basic needs of its people. 
Economic stability and growth are fundamental requirements for 
sustainable democracy.  As described above, democracy requires 
solid institutions of civil society, and a sufficient level of social capital 
 
 123. WDI ONLINE, supra note 105 (using the series “[a]djusted net savings, excluding 
particulate emission damage (% of GNI)”). 
 124. Data for Europe & Central Asia is not available for 1994. 
 125. See WORLD BANK, supra note 109, at 36 (“Negative genuine savings rates imply that 
total wealth is in decline; policies leading to persistently negative genuine savings are 
unsustainable.”). 
 126. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,  THE ARAB HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003 139 (2003)  (“Grossly unequal distributions of income, wealth 
and power adversely impact opportunities for knowledge acquisition by undercutting 
sustainable economic growth.”). 
 127. See Onn Winckler, The Demographic Dilemma of the Arab World: The Employment 
Aspect, 37 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 617, 617 (2002). 
 128. See WORLD BANK, supra note 109, at 26. 
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to spur economic growth.  Democracy is unsustainable in countries 
that lack significant intangible capital, maintain high poverty and low 
growth rates, and have savings rates too low to allow substantial 
investment in capital growth.129 
CONCLUSION: RECALIBRATING THE WAR TO AVOID 
PROMOTING TERRORISM INSTEAD OF DEVELOPMENT 
“[I]n the case of the United States, the threat to the State comes 
not from terrorism, but the response to terrorism.”130  Whether the 
impetus for the U.S.-led war on terror in the Middle East was the 
pursuit of terrorists or preventive warfare, the result has been an 
attempt at forced democratization.  The question that policymakers 
should be asking is whether this effort is having an effect on terrorist 
proliferation and, if so, whether that effect is positive.  The signs that 
terrorist activity in democratic countries is increasing are evident, but 
is there a correlation between this increasing activity and current 
democratization efforts? 
The data presented in this Article indicate there is a positive 
correlation between Western efforts to forcefully democratize the 
Middle East and the level of terrorist activity against foreign targets.  
In addition, the literature suggests that there is a comparatively weak 
relationship between democracy, rapid economic development, and 
peace.  From these findings, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
The extent and sufficiency of the United States’ preparation for 
its wars with Iraq and Afghanistan have been hotly debated and 
extensively analyzed.  However, more important is the United States’ 
lack of preparation for sustaining a peaceful transition process from 
authoritarian regimes to democracies in these countries.  The United 
States merely ensured that symbolic democratic mechanisms were in 
place—no other plan for continued support and development was 
established prior to engaging in the regime change process.  
Rebuilding Germany and Japan after World War II involved “several 
years of intensive advance planning . . . and training of key 
administrators, both military and civilian, with the organization ready 
to be put in place immediately [after] the surrenders of the defeated 
 
 129. See, e.g., BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 47, at 200 (suggesting that democracy is a 
good plan for the Middle East, but that it is unsustainable unless substantial reforms are 
undertaken first). 
 130. Bhoumik, supra note 29, at 309. 
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states had been made.”131  This planning is largely absent from the 
present plan to reconstruct the Middle East. 
The spread of democratic political and economic values to the 
developing world should focus on fostering civil society institutions, 
rather than elections and multiparty democracy.  Alex Seita claims 
that globalization should be configured to promote the values of 
liberal democracy and that Western democracies should “be able to 
determine the specific content of globalization.”132  However, he 
warns that the perception of the West as political and economic 
imperialists will not foster support for democratizing efforts.  Thus, 
the “primary vehicle for the industrialized democracies should be the 
‘rule of law[.]’”133 
A key issue in the struggle against terrorist proliferation is the 
threat of failed states.  Crumbling democracies or those that could not 
get off the ground, weak autocracies that are run by interest groups, 
and governments too weak to provide basic social services are prime 
havens for terrorist growth and development.134  Some recognition of 
this fact has led the Bush Administration to begin training more 
troops in Africa to fight the potential locus operandi of terrorist 
groups.135  However, when a nation embarks on a campaign to change 
the regime of a State, but fails to establish effective measures to 
sustain growth and development before initiating a campaign to 
change the regime of another State, it leaves the door open for a 
resurgence of terrorist activity. Afghanistan is a prime example.  
After the 2001 destruction of the Taliban ruling party, the United 
States declared victory and moved on to Iraq.136  This short-
sightedness has led to deterioration of security in the country and the 
rise of more Taliban forces.137  The citizens of Afghanistan “remain 
 
 131. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS AND THE 
INVASION OF IRAQ IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: OPINIONS ON THE EMERGING 
NEW WORLD ORDER SYSTEM 82 (2004). 
 132. Alex Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 429, 
432 (1997). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See generally Susan E. Rice, The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION POL’Y BRIEF (Brookings Institution, Wash. D.C.), Feb. 2003. 
 135. Morning Edition: United States Increasing Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa (NPR 
radio broadcast March 8, 2004) (on file with author). 
 136. See, e.g., Bush: Afghanistan Is a Victory over Terrorism, June 15, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/06/15/karzai/ (“Coalition forces, including many brave Afghans, 
have brought America, Afghanistan and the world its first victory in the war on terror[.]”). 
 137. See Gunmen Kill Candidate in Sunday’s Afghan Elections, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2005, 
at A17; Regan, supra note 7. 
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desperately poor and essentially ungoverned, scarcely better off then 
they were on September 10, 2001.”138 
Forced democratization of a developing country followed by 
minimal sustainable development practices will not achieve any 
reduction in overall terrorist activity, and in fact may make the world 
a less safe place in which to live.  Collaborative, effective and 
sustainable development practices are needed to achieve success in 
the democratization process of the Middle East.  Leadership for this 
process must come from inside the Middle East, rather than from 
foreign imposition.139  A recent Article in the Middle East Journal 
stated this need as follows: “Development depends on a political 
version of bio-diversity, in which democracy emerges organically out 
of existing local traditions and practices.”140 
Steven Cook, director of an independent task force of the 
Council of Foreign Relations, concluded that “it’s better to promote 
democracy and manage [the risk that unfriendly governments will 
result] than to do nothing and continue to face the same kinds of 
problems in the region that we currently face: political alienation, 
extremism, and, ultimately, terrorism.”141  He also suggests that one 
way in which the United States can promote democracy in the region 
is by linking political reform to aid.  In this way, “[w]e can actually 
reward countries with aid if they do the right thing on political 
reform.”142 
Cook does not address any possible alternatives to forced 
democratization, but one exists that may result in long-term stability 
and significantly less loss of life.  Effective development offers a 
solution that can provide a remedy to terrorist proliferation, a 
collaborative institutional growth approach, and eventually, 
organically developed democracy.  Ignoring this solution is 
detrimental to development and peace in the region and worldwide.  
Tying aid to political reform, much like the new U.S. Millennium 
 
 138. STERN, supra note 54, at 294 (concluding that Iraq citizens are in the same situation). 
 139. See, e.g., Oweiss, supra note 95, at 34 (noting that “reform is a historical and cultural 
process that must be homegrown”). 
 140. Jeremy Jones & Nicholas Ridout, Democratic Development in Oman, 59 MIDDLE E. J. 
376, 376 (2005). 
 141. Bernard Gwertzman, Cook: Washington Should Support “Basic Democratic 
Principles”, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., June 9, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/8177/ 
cook.html. 
 142. Id. 
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Challenge Corporation is doing,143 prevents effective development 
from taking hold in a country by ignoring several long-term 
institutional growth processes necessary to sustain democracy.144  In 
essence, with aid tied to political reform, growth will be limited by the 
amount of real and superficial external changes a country is able to 
make, without paying heed to the key institutional development and 
other key reforms that the country should make.  Countries may 
focus their efforts on satisfying the demands of Western grant-making 
institutions’ ideas of political reform at the expense of some of the 
most critical internal developmental reforms. 
One might conclude from reading this Article that there remains 
no workable solution to the war on terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Yet, while this text is intended to evaluate ideas about the best way to 
promote democracy in the Middle East from this point forward, there 
are still options remaining for Iraq and Afghanistan worthy of brief 
mention. 
The United States has placed itself in a difficult position.  If it 
leaves troops in Iraq and Afghanistan to root out terrorists and 
facilitate electoral politics, violence will likely worsen in retaliation to 
the “imperial” occupation, and fatalities and costs will continue to 
rise.  If the United States pulls troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan, a 
power vacuum will emerge and either civil war will break out or 
extremist factions will take power, reversing the limited progress that 
has been made to this point.145  Additionally, a growing number of 
Americans subscribe to the idea that the war on terror may be leading 
to an increase in the number of terrorist attacks, reflecting the need 
for policy support at home as well as abroad.146 
To resolve this quagmire, several steps must be taken.  First, 
global support must be sought.  The United States is the primary 
 
 143. See generally THE OTHER WAR: GLOBAL POVERTY AND THE MILLENNIUM 
CHALLENGE ACCOUNT (Lael Brainard  et al. eds., 2003). 
 144. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 26, at 37 (“The MCA [Millennium Challenge Account] 
may stimulate countries well on the road to reform, but it will do little for failed states and the 
world’s more troubled countries.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Andrew F. Krepinevich, How to Win in Iraq, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2005, 
at 87. 
 146. According to a Roper Center 2005 survey, 41% of surveyed Americans thought that 
the war in Iraq has led to an increase in the risk of further terrorist attacks in the United States.  
Survey by Pew Research Center and Princeton Survey Research Associates International, October 
6-October 10, 2005.  Retrieved March 5, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ 
ipoll.html. 
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occupying force in both Iraq and Afghanistan and arguably entered 
Iraq without justification in international law.  The occupation has 
already cost over $300 billion and thousands of Iraqi and American 
lives.147  Working together with committed, well-funded international 
partners will have two effects—it will substantially reduce the costs 
borne by the United States and allow for higher concentrations of 
forces in areas where citizens are at risk, and it will counteract the 
perception that America is the sole imperial power in the region.  
Garnering international support at this point may be difficult and it 
will involve significant bargaining on the part of U.S. diplomats.  In 
order for the international community to get on board, the U.S. 
strategy in the region must change and collaboration with the United 
Nations must increase. 
Rather than pursuing a policy of military dominance over 
extremist elements, the focus of the U.S. military in the region should 
shift to one of development protection.  The institutional 
development that needs to take place—establishing laws, a viable 
constitution, an independent judiciary—requires support and 
protection.  The structures required to build social capital, likewise 
require support.  For example, schools, including trade schools and 
universities, must be built, and those students pursuing education and 
training there must be protected.  Also, jobs need to be created, 
employing the masses and providing regularized salaries for potential 
sympathizers to extremist elements.148  These must not be subsidiary 
roles of the U.S.-led forces, but primary ones.  Failed efforts to build 
sustainable institutions can substantially deride support for 
democracy in the region.149  The growing sentiment throughout the 
Middle East is that the United States is not sincerely interested in 
democratic reform.150  This shift in strategy toward enhancing 
 
 147. Steven Kosiak, The Cost of US Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through 
Fiscal Year 2006 and Beyond, UPDATE (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
Wash., D.C.), Jan. 4, 2006, available at http://www.csbaonline.org (follow “latest from CSBA” 
hyperlink; then follow “The Cost of US Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through 
Fiscal Year 2006 and Beyond” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2006); see supra Tables 1a, 1b, 2. 
 148. Over the next 15 years, population growth in the region will require the addition of 
approximately 100 million new jobs.  See Ray Takeyh, Close, but No Democracy, NAT’L INT., 
Winter 2004/05, at 57. 
 149. Joe Stephens and David B. Ottoway, A Rebuilding Plan Full of Cracks, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 20, 2005, at A01 (discussing the deteriorating structures and institutions in Afghanistan 
that were rushed to completion by the U.S. prior to national elections). 
 150. See BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 47, at 53. 
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development will encourage long-term growth, ensure local 
collaboration, and engage international support. 
Finally, immediate attention must be given to long-term 
sustainable development in the Middle East and Africa.  These two 
regions are the poorest, most underdeveloped in the world and they 
have shown themselves to be economically, politically and socially 
incapable of meeting the needs of their citizens.151  The result has been 
the proliferation of Middle Eastern puppet-governments with little 
domestic legitimacy,152 and corrupt, militaristic African polities.153  The 
United States is the most prominent actor in the Middle East and thus 
is a primary target of terrorist attacks against the West.  Accordingly, 
it is in the best interests of the American people for the United States 
to pursue a policy of preventive development—to bring the growth 
and peace to the people before they bring the war and hatred to 
America. 
“[D]emocracy is the worst form of government except for all 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”154  Winston 
Churchill saw the drawbacks of democratic rule but recognized that it 
is the most workable system of our time.155  Promoting democratic 
values is wise foreign policy for democratic countries.  What needs to 
be remembered, however, is that democratic values alone do not 
bring growth, peace or sustainability.  Promoting democracy must 
encompass the promotion of development.  When key development 
indicators fail, democracy will fail.  Democracy has been advocated as 
the bringer of many goods—rapid economic growth, market 
development, free and fair elections, equality—yet when these 
deliverables fall short, support for democracies wanes and alternative 
political and economic solutions are sought.  Without successful 
sustainable development practices and the acknowledgement that 
development is a long-term process, democratic progress cannot be 
sustained. 
 
 151. While many studies identify Sub-Saharan Africa as the poorest region in the world, the 
adjusted net savings rate identified above indicates that the Middle East is even less endowed 
with capital wealth.  See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 152. See, e.g., ZAKARIA, supra note 19, at 136. 
 153. See, e.g., Ernest Harsch, Africans Taking Action on Corruption, AFRICA RECOVERY, 
July 1997, available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol11no1/corrupt.htm; see also 
Philip M. Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, 19 AM. U.  INT’L L. REV. 1307 (2004). 
 154. Winston Churchill, Address to the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 WINSTON 
CHURCHILL, HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963 at 7566 (Robert Rhodes Jones ed., 1974). 
 155. See id. 
